Coverart for item
The Resource The Iraq War : strategy, tactics, and military lessons, Anthony H. Cordesman

The Iraq War : strategy, tactics, and military lessons, Anthony H. Cordesman

Label
The Iraq War : strategy, tactics, and military lessons
Title
The Iraq War
Title remainder
strategy, tactics, and military lessons
Statement of responsibility
Anthony H. Cordesman
Creator
Subject
Language
eng
Cataloging source
DLC
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Cordesman, Anthony H
Dewey number
956.7044/3
Illustrations
maps
Index
no index present
LC call number
DS79.76
LC item number
.C67 2003b
Literary form
non fiction
Nature of contents
bibliography
http://library.link/vocab/subjectName
  • Iraq War, 2003-2011
  • Strategy
  • Tactics
  • Nation-state
Target audience
adult
Label
The Iraq War : strategy, tactics, and military lessons, Anthony H. Cordesman
Instantiates
Publication
Note
"Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Iraq's Misuse of Its Force Strength during the Fighting
  • 82
  • 31 March/1 April
  • 85
  • Regular army
  • 85
  • Republican Guard forces
  • 86
  • 1/2 April
  • 87
  • 2/3 April
  • 18
  • 90
  • 3/4 April
  • 92
  • "Battle of Baghdad"
  • 94
  • 4/5 April
  • 96
  • 5/6 April
  • 102
  • 6/7 April
  • Failures in Iraqi Leadership
  • 104
  • 7/8 April
  • 106
  • 8/9 April
  • 108
  • 9/10 April
  • 112
  • End of the Battle of Baghdad and Movement toward Tikrit
  • 114
  • 10/11 April
  • 19
  • 117
  • 11/12 April
  • 120
  • 12/13 April
  • 124
  • End of the Conflict and First Efforts at the Transition to Nation Building
  • 125
  • 13/14 April
  • 126
  • 14/15 April
  • Impact of Seapower
  • 127
  • 15/16 April
  • 130
  • 16/17 April
  • 133
  • 17/18 April
  • 138
  • 18/19 April
  • 139
  • 19/20 April
  • 20
  • 141
  • 20/21 April
  • 142
  • No Clean Ending
  • 144
  • 5
  • Three Debates: War Plan and Transformation, "Powell Doctrine" Versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine," and The "New Way of War"
  • 149
  • War Plan Debate
  • 149
  • Impact of Airpower
  • Political Factors That Make the "War Plan" Debate Largely Moot
  • 153
  • Problem of Not Knowing the Detailed History and Nature of the "War Plan"
  • 153
  • "New Way of War" Debate
  • 159
  • Need to Remember the Past
  • 160
  • New "New Way of War"?
  • 160
  • 22
  • "Powell Doctrine" versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine" Debate
  • 163
  • Need to Redefine "Decisive Force"
  • 165
  • Dangers of American "Triumphalism"
  • 168
  • 6
  • Lessons About the Interaction Between Military Fundamentals and New Tactics and Technology
  • 173
  • Value of Training, Readiness, and Human Factors
  • Size and Nature of the Iraqi Air Force
  • 174
  • Innovation and Initiative
  • 176
  • Morale and Motivation
  • 177
  • Competence, Adaptiveness, and Flexibility in War Planning
  • 178
  • Synchronicity, Simultaneity, Speed, Jointness, and Combined Arms
  • 180
  • Situational Awareness, Intelligence, and Command and Communications
  • 22
  • 183
  • Scale of the IS&R Effort
  • 184
  • Limits of IS&R Organization and Integration
  • 184
  • Need for Improvisation and Tailoring IS&R Systems to a Given Conflict
  • 190
  • Limits of IS&R Capability
  • 193
  • Impact of Space Warfare
  • 2
  • Size and Nature of the Coalition Air Component
  • 195
  • Overall Coalition Superiority
  • 195
  • Evolving Space into Jointness
  • 196
  • Space and Communications
  • 198
  • Ongoing Evolution of Space
  • 199
  • Importance of GPS
  • 24
  • 200
  • GPS Jammers and Countermeasures
  • 201
  • "Owning the Night" and "All-Weather Warfare"
  • 202
  • Need for Improved Tactical Support Capabilities
  • 202
  • Need for Better Radar and Space Capabilities
  • 203
  • Importance of Sustainability
  • Coalition Application of Airpower
  • 203
  • Airborne Refueling
  • 204
  • Logistics and Power Projection
  • 205
  • Airlift and Sealift
  • 207
  • Role of the Reserves
  • 209
  • 7
  • 28
  • Lessons Affecting the Overall Conduct of the War and Joint Forces
  • 215
  • Land Power-Reinforced Air Power and Vice Versa
  • 216
  • Increased Tempo of Operations: Shock and Awe versus Precision and Focus
  • 218
  • Netcentric Warfare, IS&R Technology, Processing, Integration, and Near-Real-Time Information Flow and Targeting
  • 219
  • Broader Picture: The Need to Restructure U.S. Command and Control Systems and the Possible Need to Restructure Theater Commands
  • 221
  • Effects-based Bombing
  • Areas for Improvement and Problems at the Battalion Level
  • 222
  • Target Characterization and Battle Damage Assessment
  • 227
  • Bandwidth
  • 230
  • Asymmetric Warfare
  • 231
  • Friendly Fire and Casualty Issues
  • 238
  • 28
  • Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System
  • 240
  • Blue Force Trackers
  • 243
  • Postwar Review of Force Plans, Basing, and Transformational Restocking
  • 245
  • Broader Implications of Cutting Enemy Casualties and Collateral Damage: A New Dual Standard and Form of Asymmetric Warfare?
  • 246
  • Iraqi Civilian Casualties
  • 246
  • Anything but a Cakewalk
  • Iraqi Military Casualties
  • 247
  • Problems with Not Estimating Casualties in a World Seeking "No Casualty" Wars
  • 247
  • 8
  • Air, Missile, and Land-Based Air Defense Forces
  • 253
  • Air Dominance
  • 253
  • Effects-based Bombing: Fundamentally Changing the Effectiveness of Air Power While Limiting Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage
  • 29
  • 256
  • Understanding Effects-based Bombing
  • 257
  • Pattern of Effects-based Bombing during the War
  • 274
  • Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage
  • 275
  • True Precision Air-Strike Capability
  • 276
  • Understanding the True Meaning of Precision
  • Land-based Air Defenses
  • 277
  • Scale and Nature of the Coalition Effort
  • 279
  • In-Flight and Rapid Targeting and Retargeting: Time-Sensitive Strikes
  • 280
  • Stealth
  • 283
  • Close Air Support
  • 285
  • Urban Close Air Support: A Reality under the Right Conditions
  • 32
  • 285
  • Value of Expeditionary Air Power and Problems in Allied Readiness, Interoperability, and Modernization
  • 287
  • Changes in Air Combat Packages
  • 289
  • Hard-Target Kill Capabilities
  • 290
  • Cruise Missiles
  • 291
  • Use of Precision Air Munitions
  • Limits of Analysis: What We Don't Yet Know
  • Iraqi Air Defense Command
  • 294
  • Laser-guided Bombs and the JADM
  • 294
  • Other Guided Weapons and the CBU-105
  • 295
  • AGM-130, SLAM, and JSOW
  • 296
  • British Use of Precision Weapons
  • 297
  • Dumb Weapons and Strafing
  • 32
  • 299
  • Problem of Cluster Munitions
  • 299
  • Bomber and the Advantage of Range-Payload
  • 300
  • Continuing Role of the Bomber
  • 301
  • Impact of the B-1B Lancer
  • 302
  • Future mix of B-1Bs and B-52s
  • Weakness of Iraqi Air Defenses
  • 302
  • Impact of Range-Payload on Fighter Attack Aircraft and the F/A-18E/F
  • 303
  • Issue of Survivability in Future Wars
  • 304
  • Role of the E-8C JSTARS
  • 304
  • Evolving capabilities of JSTARS
  • 304
  • Integrating JSTARS into joint warfare
  • 34
  • 306
  • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
  • 307
  • Predator
  • 307
  • Global Hawk
  • 308
  • Dragon Eye
  • 309
  • Shadow and the Raven
  • Iraqi and Coalition Land Forces
  • 312
  • UAV Tactical User Interface
  • 312
  • UAV Procurement and the UAV Road Map
  • 315
  • Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-10
  • 316
  • Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-64 Apache and Other Attack Helicopters
  • 317
  • Apache and Apache Longbow
  • 36
  • 317
  • A Need for Changes in Tactics and/or Technology?
  • 318
  • Need for Joint Fixed-Wing and Rotary-Wing Attack Operations?
  • 323
  • Balancing Lessons from AH-1 Operations
  • 324
  • U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier
  • 333
  • U.S. Marine Corps V-22 Osprey
  • Coalition Land Forces
  • 335
  • Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)
  • 335
  • Role of the Patriot
  • 338
  • 9
  • Lessons Affecting Army Land Forces
  • 349
  • Value of Main Battle Tanks and Heavy Firepower and Armor
  • 351
  • 37
  • Legacy versus Future Combat Systems
  • 351
  • Tank Losses, Causes, and Lessons Learned
  • 353
  • "Precision Artillery" as a Partner to "Precision Air Power"
  • 358
  • MLRS/ATACMS
  • 359
  • Potential Impact of SADARM
  • 360
  • Size and Capability of Iraqi Forces
  • Special Forces as an Element of Joint Warfare
  • 362
  • Tactical Role of Special Forces
  • 362
  • Technology
  • 363
  • "Snake Eaters" with Maste's Degrees
  • 364
  • Tactics of Improved Jointness
  • 365
  • 40
  • Urban Land Warfare
  • 365
  • Maneuverability Rather Than Fighting on Traditional Terms?
  • 366
  • Force the Defender to Maneuver and Move Outside of Cities
  • 367
  • Postwar Urban Warfare
  • 367
  • Research and Re-research on Local Weather and Operating Conditions
  • 368
  • 7
  • Iraqi Land Force Command Structure
  • Problem of Allied Power Projection, Interoperability, and Allied War-Fighting Capability
  • 368
  • 10
  • Lessons Affecting Marine Corps Land Forces
  • 373
  • Marines: Both "Post-Amphibious" and "Post-Littoral" Forces
  • 374
  • Detailed Lessons from Marine Forces: Friction and the Continuing Fog of War
  • 375
  • Lessons from the Combat Assessment Team Report for the Marine Corps Systems Command
  • 42
  • 381
  • Lessons from Field Reporting from the 1st Marine Division
  • 388
  • Marine Corps Artillery
  • 393
  • Friendly Fire
  • 394
  • Marine Corps Supply and Logistics
  • 395
  • 11
  • Iraqi Manpower Base
  • Lessons Affecting Naval Forces
  • 399
  • Aircraft Carriers
  • 399
  • Jointness in Naval Air Operations
  • 400
  • Jointness in C3, IS&R, and "Open Architecture"
  • 401
  • Cruise Missile Ships
  • 401
  • 43
  • Mine Warfare and Naval Raids
  • 401
  • Value of Sealift and Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships
  • 402
  • Value of Allies
  • 403
  • 12
  • Lessons Relating to Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • 405
  • Intelligence Strengths and Weaknesses
  • Iraqi Land Force Order of Battle
  • 405
  • Need for Better Assessment, Characterization, and Location of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Key Delivery Systems
  • 407
  • Key Points in the U.S. and British White Papers
  • 408 --
  • 44
  • Deployment of Iraqi Land Forces
  • 45
  • Iraq's Irregular Forces
  • 47
  • 3
  • Iraqi Tank Strength
  • 48
  • Other Iraqi Armored Equipment Strength
  • 48
  • Iraqi Artillery Strength
  • 49
  • Other Iraqi Major Land-Force Weapons
  • 50
  • Army Aviation
  • 51
  • Forces Engaged
  • Army Air Defenses
  • 51
  • Other Qualitative Problems
  • 51
  • Problem of Future Force Ratios
  • 52
  • 4
  • Course of the War and the Interaction of Joint Forces
  • 57
  • Beginning of the Conflict: The Decapitation Strike and Initial Land Advance
  • 15
  • 58
  • 18/19 March: Prelude
  • 60
  • 19/20 March: G-Day
  • 61
  • Intensive Air Operations and Continuing Land Advances
  • 62
  • 20/21 March
  • 64
  • 21/22 March
  • Changing and Uncertain Nature of Force Ratios
  • 65
  • 22/23 March
  • 69
  • 23/24 March
  • 72
  • 24/25 March
  • 73
  • Continuing Advance from the South
  • 74
  • 25/26 March
  • 15
  • 76
  • 26/27 March
  • 77
  • 27/28 March
  • 79
  • 28/29 March
  • 80
  • 29/30 March
  • 82
  • 30/31 March
  • Outstanding issues concerning Iraq's compliance with the UN effort
  • Lessons Relating to Political, Diplomatic, and Psychological Warfare
  • 511
  • Limited Success in Psychological Warfare
  • 511
  • Long-standing Failures in Public Diplomacy
  • 513
  • Problems Stemming from the Bush Administration
  • 514
  • Strategic and Grand Strategic Aspects of Psychological and Political Warfare
  • 515
  • 433
  • Overall Importance of Conflict Termination as a Critical Part of War Fighting
  • 515
  • 17
  • Grand Strategy: the Civilian Aspects of Nation Building and the Challenge of Winning the Peace
  • 517
  • Short-Term Challenges and the Risk of Guerrilla War
  • 517
  • Nation Building versus Guerrilla Warfare: Best, Worst, and Probable Cases
  • 519
  • Lessons for Near-Term Action
  • Costs of Politicizing Intelligence
  • 524
  • Medium-Term and Longer-Term Challenges in Nation Building
  • 527
  • Fracture Lines in the Postwar Infrastructure
  • 529
  • Political Fracture Lines
  • 536
  • Internal Political Fracture Lines
  • 536
  • External Political Fracture Lines
  • 441
  • 539
  • Demographic Fracture Lines
  • 542
  • Economic Fracture Lines
  • 542
  • Economic Strains and Weaknesses
  • 543
  • Debt, Reparations, and Contingency Contracts
  • 543
  • Energy and Oil Export Fracture Lines
  • Need for Rapid and Reliable Characterization of Chemical and Biological Agents and the Coalition Intelligence Effort
  • 544
  • Iraqi Oil Development Needs
  • 545
  • Contingency Contracts Signed under Saddam
  • 546
  • Ethnic Fracture Lines of Oil Development and Control
  • 547
  • Fracture Lines of Oil and Gas Exports
  • 548
  • Transparency and Conspiracy Theories
  • 447
  • 551
  • New Fracture Lines Caused by Disarmament and the Need to Rebuild Iraqi Military Forces
  • 551
  • Lessons for Peacemaking and Nation Building
  • 555
  • 18
  • Grand Strategy: the Outcome of the Iraq War and the New Old Middle East
  • 559
  • An Example of What?
  • 559
  • Organized Searches for Weapons of Mass Destruction in Proliferating Countries: The Search during and after the War
  • Israel and the Second Intifada
  • 561
  • Iran
  • 562
  • Syria
  • 563
  • Turkey
  • 564
  • Saudi Arabia and the Southern Gulf States
  • 565
  • 450
  • Jordan
  • 566
  • Egypt
  • 567
  • North Africa
  • 567
  • Islamic Extremism and Terrorism
  • 568
  • U.S. Role and Presence in the Region
  • 568
  • Initial Search Effort
  • Energy Imports and Energy Security
  • 569
  • Underlying Factors That Shape the New Old Middle East
  • 570
  • 451
  • Problems in Collecting Data on Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems
  • Expanding the Effort and Creating the Iraq Survey Group
  • 452
  • Conversion to a Forensic Search Effort
  • 454
  • Lessons for the Future
  • 455
  • 13
  • Other Lessons
  • 471
  • Role of Women in Combat
  • 425
  • 471
  • Military Medical Facilities and Capabilities
  • 471
  • Safety--Becoming More Critical
  • 472
  • 14
  • Lessons from Iraqi Problems and Shortcomings
  • 475
  • Iraq Really Was a Tyranny
  • 476
  • Problems in Analyzing Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems
  • Iraq Had Rival Politicized, Bureaucratic, and Compartmentalized Forces
  • 476
  • Wasting the Best Forces Wastes All the Forces
  • 479
  • Losing the Republican Guards in Open Warfare
  • 479
  • Making Urban Warfare in Baghdad Difficult to Impossible
  • 480
  • Problem of Sanctions and Equipment Modernization
  • 481
  • 429
  • Iraqi Wartime Preparations Emphasized the Wrong Ideology and Type of Psychological Operations
  • 482
  • Iraqi Command and Control: A Blind Force as Well as One without a Brain
  • 483
  • Iraqi Irregular Warfare Tactics: Unexpected but More an Irritant Than Effective
  • 483
  • Irregular Tactics Have Limited Success Unless They Have Popular Support
  • 483
  • Problems in Urban Warfare
  • 484
  • Politics of Characterizing and Targeting Iraqi WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems
  • Iraq Failed to Use Its Weapons of Mass Destruction If It Had Them
  • 484
  • Other Failures
  • 485
  • Failure to Use Missiles Effectively
  • 485
  • Failure to Use Water Barriers
  • 485
  • Force Protection
  • 485
  • 431
  • 15
  • Lessons Regarding the Value of Allies and Build-Up Time
  • 487
  • Allies and Interoperability
  • 487
  • Value of Regional Allies
  • 490
  • Value of Rebuilding Alliances
  • 491
  • 16
  • Dealing with a proven proliferator
  • Military Lessons Relating to Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building
  • 493
  • Impact of Limited Military Resources
  • 494
  • Avoidable Problems
  • 496
  • Problems in International Coordination
  • 497
  • Failures in U.S. Policymaking and Leadership
  • 497
  • 432
  • Failures at the Field and Tactical Levels
  • 499
  • A Failure of U.S. Leadership and Organization
  • 504
  • Inability of the U.S. Military to Properly Conceptualize and Understand Grand Strategy
  • 506
  • There Is No "New Way of War" without Successful Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building
  • 508
  • Intelligence on Conflict Termination and Nation Building
  • 509
Control code
ocm52821128
Dimensions
25 cm
Extent
xiv, 572 pages
Isbn
9780275982270
Lccn
2003058922
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
Note
956.70443 C811 ; XX-N ; REV3-04BT3.
Other physical details
maps
System control number
  • (Sirsi) 52821128
  • (Sirsi) i9780275982270
  • i0275982270
Label
The Iraq War : strategy, tactics, and military lessons, Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication
Note
"Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C."
Bibliography note
Includes bibliographical references
Carrier category
volume
Carrier category code
  • nc
Carrier MARC source
rdacarrier
Content category
text
Content type code
  • txt
Content type MARC source
rdacontent
Contents
  • Iraq's Misuse of Its Force Strength during the Fighting
  • 82
  • 31 March/1 April
  • 85
  • Regular army
  • 85
  • Republican Guard forces
  • 86
  • 1/2 April
  • 87
  • 2/3 April
  • 18
  • 90
  • 3/4 April
  • 92
  • "Battle of Baghdad"
  • 94
  • 4/5 April
  • 96
  • 5/6 April
  • 102
  • 6/7 April
  • Failures in Iraqi Leadership
  • 104
  • 7/8 April
  • 106
  • 8/9 April
  • 108
  • 9/10 April
  • 112
  • End of the Battle of Baghdad and Movement toward Tikrit
  • 114
  • 10/11 April
  • 19
  • 117
  • 11/12 April
  • 120
  • 12/13 April
  • 124
  • End of the Conflict and First Efforts at the Transition to Nation Building
  • 125
  • 13/14 April
  • 126
  • 14/15 April
  • Impact of Seapower
  • 127
  • 15/16 April
  • 130
  • 16/17 April
  • 133
  • 17/18 April
  • 138
  • 18/19 April
  • 139
  • 19/20 April
  • 20
  • 141
  • 20/21 April
  • 142
  • No Clean Ending
  • 144
  • 5
  • Three Debates: War Plan and Transformation, "Powell Doctrine" Versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine," and The "New Way of War"
  • 149
  • War Plan Debate
  • 149
  • Impact of Airpower
  • Political Factors That Make the "War Plan" Debate Largely Moot
  • 153
  • Problem of Not Knowing the Detailed History and Nature of the "War Plan"
  • 153
  • "New Way of War" Debate
  • 159
  • Need to Remember the Past
  • 160
  • New "New Way of War"?
  • 160
  • 22
  • "Powell Doctrine" versus "Rumsfeld Doctrine" Debate
  • 163
  • Need to Redefine "Decisive Force"
  • 165
  • Dangers of American "Triumphalism"
  • 168
  • 6
  • Lessons About the Interaction Between Military Fundamentals and New Tactics and Technology
  • 173
  • Value of Training, Readiness, and Human Factors
  • Size and Nature of the Iraqi Air Force
  • 174
  • Innovation and Initiative
  • 176
  • Morale and Motivation
  • 177
  • Competence, Adaptiveness, and Flexibility in War Planning
  • 178
  • Synchronicity, Simultaneity, Speed, Jointness, and Combined Arms
  • 180
  • Situational Awareness, Intelligence, and Command and Communications
  • 22
  • 183
  • Scale of the IS&R Effort
  • 184
  • Limits of IS&R Organization and Integration
  • 184
  • Need for Improvisation and Tailoring IS&R Systems to a Given Conflict
  • 190
  • Limits of IS&R Capability
  • 193
  • Impact of Space Warfare
  • 2
  • Size and Nature of the Coalition Air Component
  • 195
  • Overall Coalition Superiority
  • 195
  • Evolving Space into Jointness
  • 196
  • Space and Communications
  • 198
  • Ongoing Evolution of Space
  • 199
  • Importance of GPS
  • 24
  • 200
  • GPS Jammers and Countermeasures
  • 201
  • "Owning the Night" and "All-Weather Warfare"
  • 202
  • Need for Improved Tactical Support Capabilities
  • 202
  • Need for Better Radar and Space Capabilities
  • 203
  • Importance of Sustainability
  • Coalition Application of Airpower
  • 203
  • Airborne Refueling
  • 204
  • Logistics and Power Projection
  • 205
  • Airlift and Sealift
  • 207
  • Role of the Reserves
  • 209
  • 7
  • 28
  • Lessons Affecting the Overall Conduct of the War and Joint Forces
  • 215
  • Land Power-Reinforced Air Power and Vice Versa
  • 216
  • Increased Tempo of Operations: Shock and Awe versus Precision and Focus
  • 218
  • Netcentric Warfare, IS&R Technology, Processing, Integration, and Near-Real-Time Information Flow and Targeting
  • 219
  • Broader Picture: The Need to Restructure U.S. Command and Control Systems and the Possible Need to Restructure Theater Commands
  • 221
  • Effects-based Bombing
  • Areas for Improvement and Problems at the Battalion Level
  • 222
  • Target Characterization and Battle Damage Assessment
  • 227
  • Bandwidth
  • 230
  • Asymmetric Warfare
  • 231
  • Friendly Fire and Casualty Issues
  • 238
  • 28
  • Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) System
  • 240
  • Blue Force Trackers
  • 243
  • Postwar Review of Force Plans, Basing, and Transformational Restocking
  • 245
  • Broader Implications of Cutting Enemy Casualties and Collateral Damage: A New Dual Standard and Form of Asymmetric Warfare?
  • 246
  • Iraqi Civilian Casualties
  • 246
  • Anything but a Cakewalk
  • Iraqi Military Casualties
  • 247
  • Problems with Not Estimating Casualties in a World Seeking "No Casualty" Wars
  • 247
  • 8
  • Air, Missile, and Land-Based Air Defense Forces
  • 253
  • Air Dominance
  • 253
  • Effects-based Bombing: Fundamentally Changing the Effectiveness of Air Power While Limiting Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage
  • 29
  • 256
  • Understanding Effects-based Bombing
  • 257
  • Pattern of Effects-based Bombing during the War
  • 274
  • Civilian Casualties and Collateral Damage
  • 275
  • True Precision Air-Strike Capability
  • 276
  • Understanding the True Meaning of Precision
  • Land-based Air Defenses
  • 277
  • Scale and Nature of the Coalition Effort
  • 279
  • In-Flight and Rapid Targeting and Retargeting: Time-Sensitive Strikes
  • 280
  • Stealth
  • 283
  • Close Air Support
  • 285
  • Urban Close Air Support: A Reality under the Right Conditions
  • 32
  • 285
  • Value of Expeditionary Air Power and Problems in Allied Readiness, Interoperability, and Modernization
  • 287
  • Changes in Air Combat Packages
  • 289
  • Hard-Target Kill Capabilities
  • 290
  • Cruise Missiles
  • 291
  • Use of Precision Air Munitions
  • Limits of Analysis: What We Don't Yet Know
  • Iraqi Air Defense Command
  • 294
  • Laser-guided Bombs and the JADM
  • 294
  • Other Guided Weapons and the CBU-105
  • 295
  • AGM-130, SLAM, and JSOW
  • 296
  • British Use of Precision Weapons
  • 297
  • Dumb Weapons and Strafing
  • 32
  • 299
  • Problem of Cluster Munitions
  • 299
  • Bomber and the Advantage of Range-Payload
  • 300
  • Continuing Role of the Bomber
  • 301
  • Impact of the B-1B Lancer
  • 302
  • Future mix of B-1Bs and B-52s
  • Weakness of Iraqi Air Defenses
  • 302
  • Impact of Range-Payload on Fighter Attack Aircraft and the F/A-18E/F
  • 303
  • Issue of Survivability in Future Wars
  • 304
  • Role of the E-8C JSTARS
  • 304
  • Evolving capabilities of JSTARS
  • 304
  • Integrating JSTARS into joint warfare
  • 34
  • 306
  • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
  • 307
  • Predator
  • 307
  • Global Hawk
  • 308
  • Dragon Eye
  • 309
  • Shadow and the Raven
  • Iraqi and Coalition Land Forces
  • 312
  • UAV Tactical User Interface
  • 312
  • UAV Procurement and the UAV Road Map
  • 315
  • Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-10
  • 316
  • Strengths and Weaknesses of the A-64 Apache and Other Attack Helicopters
  • 317
  • Apache and Apache Longbow
  • 36
  • 317
  • A Need for Changes in Tactics and/or Technology?
  • 318
  • Need for Joint Fixed-Wing and Rotary-Wing Attack Operations?
  • 323
  • Balancing Lessons from AH-1 Operations
  • 324
  • U.S. Marine Corps AV-8B Harrier
  • 333
  • U.S. Marine Corps V-22 Osprey
  • Coalition Land Forces
  • 335
  • Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)
  • 335
  • Role of the Patriot
  • 338
  • 9
  • Lessons Affecting Army Land Forces
  • 349
  • Value of Main Battle Tanks and Heavy Firepower and Armor
  • 351
  • 37
  • Legacy versus Future Combat Systems
  • 351
  • Tank Losses, Causes, and Lessons Learned
  • 353
  • "Precision Artillery" as a Partner to "Precision Air Power"
  • 358
  • MLRS/ATACMS
  • 359
  • Potential Impact of SADARM
  • 360
  • Size and Capability of Iraqi Forces
  • Special Forces as an Element of Joint Warfare
  • 362
  • Tactical Role of Special Forces
  • 362
  • Technology
  • 363
  • "Snake Eaters" with Maste's Degrees
  • 364
  • Tactics of Improved Jointness
  • 365
  • 40
  • Urban Land Warfare
  • 365
  • Maneuverability Rather Than Fighting on Traditional Terms?
  • 366
  • Force the Defender to Maneuver and Move Outside of Cities
  • 367
  • Postwar Urban Warfare
  • 367
  • Research and Re-research on Local Weather and Operating Conditions
  • 368
  • 7
  • Iraqi Land Force Command Structure
  • Problem of Allied Power Projection, Interoperability, and Allied War-Fighting Capability
  • 368
  • 10
  • Lessons Affecting Marine Corps Land Forces
  • 373
  • Marines: Both "Post-Amphibious" and "Post-Littoral" Forces
  • 374
  • Detailed Lessons from Marine Forces: Friction and the Continuing Fog of War
  • 375
  • Lessons from the Combat Assessment Team Report for the Marine Corps Systems Command
  • 42
  • 381
  • Lessons from Field Reporting from the 1st Marine Division
  • 388
  • Marine Corps Artillery
  • 393
  • Friendly Fire
  • 394
  • Marine Corps Supply and Logistics
  • 395
  • 11
  • Iraqi Manpower Base
  • Lessons Affecting Naval Forces
  • 399
  • Aircraft Carriers
  • 399
  • Jointness in Naval Air Operations
  • 400
  • Jointness in C3, IS&R, and "Open Architecture"
  • 401
  • Cruise Missile Ships
  • 401
  • 43
  • Mine Warfare and Naval Raids
  • 401
  • Value of Sealift and Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships
  • 402
  • Value of Allies
  • 403
  • 12
  • Lessons Relating to Intelligence and Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • 405
  • Intelligence Strengths and Weaknesses
  • Iraqi Land Force Order of Battle
  • 405
  • Need for Better Assessment, Characterization, and Location of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Key Delivery Systems
  • 407
  • Key Points in the U.S. and British White Papers
  • 408 --
  • 44
  • Deployment of Iraqi Land Forces
  • 45
  • Iraq's Irregular Forces
  • 47
  • 3
  • Iraqi Tank Strength
  • 48
  • Other Iraqi Armored Equipment Strength
  • 48
  • Iraqi Artillery Strength
  • 49
  • Other Iraqi Major Land-Force Weapons
  • 50
  • Army Aviation
  • 51
  • Forces Engaged
  • Army Air Defenses
  • 51
  • Other Qualitative Problems
  • 51
  • Problem of Future Force Ratios
  • 52
  • 4
  • Course of the War and the Interaction of Joint Forces
  • 57
  • Beginning of the Conflict: The Decapitation Strike and Initial Land Advance
  • 15
  • 58
  • 18/19 March: Prelude
  • 60
  • 19/20 March: G-Day
  • 61
  • Intensive Air Operations and Continuing Land Advances
  • 62
  • 20/21 March
  • 64
  • 21/22 March
  • Changing and Uncertain Nature of Force Ratios
  • 65
  • 22/23 March
  • 69
  • 23/24 March
  • 72
  • 24/25 March
  • 73
  • Continuing Advance from the South
  • 74
  • 25/26 March
  • 15
  • 76
  • 26/27 March
  • 77
  • 27/28 March
  • 79
  • 28/29 March
  • 80
  • 29/30 March
  • 82
  • 30/31 March
  • Outstanding issues concerning Iraq's compliance with the UN effort
  • Lessons Relating to Political, Diplomatic, and Psychological Warfare
  • 511
  • Limited Success in Psychological Warfare
  • 511
  • Long-standing Failures in Public Diplomacy
  • 513
  • Problems Stemming from the Bush Administration
  • 514
  • Strategic and Grand Strategic Aspects of Psychological and Political Warfare
  • 515
  • 433
  • Overall Importance of Conflict Termination as a Critical Part of War Fighting
  • 515
  • 17
  • Grand Strategy: the Civilian Aspects of Nation Building and the Challenge of Winning the Peace
  • 517
  • Short-Term Challenges and the Risk of Guerrilla War
  • 517
  • Nation Building versus Guerrilla Warfare: Best, Worst, and Probable Cases
  • 519
  • Lessons for Near-Term Action
  • Costs of Politicizing Intelligence
  • 524
  • Medium-Term and Longer-Term Challenges in Nation Building
  • 527
  • Fracture Lines in the Postwar Infrastructure
  • 529
  • Political Fracture Lines
  • 536
  • Internal Political Fracture Lines
  • 536
  • External Political Fracture Lines
  • 441
  • 539
  • Demographic Fracture Lines
  • 542
  • Economic Fracture Lines
  • 542
  • Economic Strains and Weaknesses
  • 543
  • Debt, Reparations, and Contingency Contracts
  • 543
  • Energy and Oil Export Fracture Lines
  • Need for Rapid and Reliable Characterization of Chemical and Biological Agents and the Coalition Intelligence Effort
  • 544
  • Iraqi Oil Development Needs
  • 545
  • Contingency Contracts Signed under Saddam
  • 546
  • Ethnic Fracture Lines of Oil Development and Control
  • 547
  • Fracture Lines of Oil and Gas Exports
  • 548
  • Transparency and Conspiracy Theories
  • 447
  • 551
  • New Fracture Lines Caused by Disarmament and the Need to Rebuild Iraqi Military Forces
  • 551
  • Lessons for Peacemaking and Nation Building
  • 555
  • 18
  • Grand Strategy: the Outcome of the Iraq War and the New Old Middle East
  • 559
  • An Example of What?
  • 559
  • Organized Searches for Weapons of Mass Destruction in Proliferating Countries: The Search during and after the War
  • Israel and the Second Intifada
  • 561
  • Iran
  • 562
  • Syria
  • 563
  • Turkey
  • 564
  • Saudi Arabia and the Southern Gulf States
  • 565
  • 450
  • Jordan
  • 566
  • Egypt
  • 567
  • North Africa
  • 567
  • Islamic Extremism and Terrorism
  • 568
  • U.S. Role and Presence in the Region
  • 568
  • Initial Search Effort
  • Energy Imports and Energy Security
  • 569
  • Underlying Factors That Shape the New Old Middle East
  • 570
  • 451
  • Problems in Collecting Data on Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems
  • Expanding the Effort and Creating the Iraq Survey Group
  • 452
  • Conversion to a Forensic Search Effort
  • 454
  • Lessons for the Future
  • 455
  • 13
  • Other Lessons
  • 471
  • Role of Women in Combat
  • 425
  • 471
  • Military Medical Facilities and Capabilities
  • 471
  • Safety--Becoming More Critical
  • 472
  • 14
  • Lessons from Iraqi Problems and Shortcomings
  • 475
  • Iraq Really Was a Tyranny
  • 476
  • Problems in Analyzing Iraqi and Other Country WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems
  • Iraq Had Rival Politicized, Bureaucratic, and Compartmentalized Forces
  • 476
  • Wasting the Best Forces Wastes All the Forces
  • 479
  • Losing the Republican Guards in Open Warfare
  • 479
  • Making Urban Warfare in Baghdad Difficult to Impossible
  • 480
  • Problem of Sanctions and Equipment Modernization
  • 481
  • 429
  • Iraqi Wartime Preparations Emphasized the Wrong Ideology and Type of Psychological Operations
  • 482
  • Iraqi Command and Control: A Blind Force as Well as One without a Brain
  • 483
  • Iraqi Irregular Warfare Tactics: Unexpected but More an Irritant Than Effective
  • 483
  • Irregular Tactics Have Limited Success Unless They Have Popular Support
  • 483
  • Problems in Urban Warfare
  • 484
  • Politics of Characterizing and Targeting Iraqi WMD Capabilities and Delivery Systems
  • Iraq Failed to Use Its Weapons of Mass Destruction If It Had Them
  • 484
  • Other Failures
  • 485
  • Failure to Use Missiles Effectively
  • 485
  • Failure to Use Water Barriers
  • 485
  • Force Protection
  • 485
  • 431
  • 15
  • Lessons Regarding the Value of Allies and Build-Up Time
  • 487
  • Allies and Interoperability
  • 487
  • Value of Regional Allies
  • 490
  • Value of Rebuilding Alliances
  • 491
  • 16
  • Dealing with a proven proliferator
  • Military Lessons Relating to Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building
  • 493
  • Impact of Limited Military Resources
  • 494
  • Avoidable Problems
  • 496
  • Problems in International Coordination
  • 497
  • Failures in U.S. Policymaking and Leadership
  • 497
  • 432
  • Failures at the Field and Tactical Levels
  • 499
  • A Failure of U.S. Leadership and Organization
  • 504
  • Inability of the U.S. Military to Properly Conceptualize and Understand Grand Strategy
  • 506
  • There Is No "New Way of War" without Successful Conflict Termination, Peacemaking, and Nation Building
  • 508
  • Intelligence on Conflict Termination and Nation Building
  • 509
Control code
ocm52821128
Dimensions
25 cm
Extent
xiv, 572 pages
Isbn
9780275982270
Lccn
2003058922
Media category
unmediated
Media MARC source
rdamedia
Media type code
  • n
Note
956.70443 C811 ; XX-N ; REV3-04BT3.
Other physical details
maps
System control number
  • (Sirsi) 52821128
  • (Sirsi) i9780275982270
  • i0275982270

Library Locations

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      39.234827 -94.433348
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